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cases, and Rylands v. Fletcher has been
Thus it was
cited with approbation.
held in Shipley v. The Fifty Associates,
106 Mass. 198, that "the person who for
his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep
it in at his peril ; and if he does not do
so, he is prima fade answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of such escape."
And this language was quoted and approved in Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass.
238, where GRA Y, C. J., says: "The
only exceptions to the liability which
have been judicially recognised are in
case of the plaintiff's own fault, or of
vis major, the act of God, or the acts
of third persons, which the owner had no
reason to anticipate." That was a case
where a party-wall built by the defendant
fell and crushed the building of the plaintiff upon the adjoining lot. The jury
found as a fact that either the defendants or the masons employed by them
were guilty of negligence, and the main
question involved was whether the defendants were responsible for the masons'
negligence ; but Judge GRAY, apparently
having in mind the seemingly different
views which have prevailed in regard to
Rylands v. Fletcher, says: "The present
case does not require us to decide whether
it is more accurate to say that it is not a

question of negligence, and that the defendant is liable even in case of latent
defect, or to say that the fall of the wall,
in the absence of proof of inevitable accident or of the wrongful act of third
persons, is sufficient evidence of negligence."
Rylands v. Fletcher was followed in
Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324, and
apparently the defendants were held liable
without proof of negligence. The casei
were here very elaborately examined by
See, also, Knapheide v.
RIPLEY, C. J.
Eastman, 20 Minn. 479, and many other
cases.
It should be remembered, however,
that even in Rylands v. Fletcher, it was
found as a fact that although there was no
personal negligence or default on the part
of the defendants themselves, "reasonable
and proper care were not exercised by the
persons they employed to provide for
the sufficiency of the reservoir to bear
the pressure of water which, when filled
to the height proposed, it would have to
bear ;" and the real point involved was
whether the defendants were liable for
the negligence of the contractors employed by them. See L. R., 1 Ex. 268,
269, 276. The actual decision, therefore, in Rylands v. Fletcher, may be
sound, even if the dicta are disapproved.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

Boston.
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An owner of land tnrough whose property a public highway runs, has an absolute
right to use a portion of such highway for certain purposes, for a temporary period
and in a reasonable manner, and this right may be exercised in derogation of the
travelling public.
The mere exercise of this right of obstruction for a lawful purpose imposes no
liability to pay for damages resulting therefrom. It must be an unreasonable or
negligent exercise of the right to impose liability.
The owner of land along a highway, who places an object near such highway, on
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his land, is not liable if it scares a horse driven along the highway, unless such
object is calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, well broken for travelling upon public highways.
In an action for injuries alleged to have been caused by the fall and death of a
horse, occasioned by his taking fright at an object on the hlghway, witnesses familiar with horses may be asked their opinion as to whether the object was calculated
to frighten the horse, and whether the mere fall or the fright could have killed him.
The owners of property through which a highway ran were engaged in whitewashing their fence. In order to do this they used a small barrel mounted on
wheels, which was full of whitewash, and which was moved along from time to lime
as the work progressed. This barrel was left standing, covered over with a cloth,
and having a shovel projecting a short distance above its top all day Sunday oil one
side of the beaten track. In an action against such property owners for an injury
alleged to have been occasioned by a horse taking fright at this object: Held, that
the jury should have been instructed that unless there was something of an unusual
and extraordinary character in the structure and appearance of this apparatus which
would naturally tend to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness and training, it was
not negligence to use it, and that its reasonable use for no longer a time than was
fairly required along the highway in whitewashing the defendants' fences would not
subject defendants to liability even though some horses might or did take fright at
seeing it.
Travelling on Sunday, in such a case, is not a defence which can be set up by a
private citizen against a possible liability, if established by the other facts of the
case.
In the above case plaintiff having proved that other horses had been frightened by
the same object, evidence was held admissible on behalf of defendants to show that
those horses were skittish horses. f

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Bradford county.

Case, by Alice Simmers against Victor E. Piollet and Joseph E.
Piollet to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused
by the negligence of the defendants.
On the trial, before MORROW, P. J., the following facts appeared:
The defendants are the owners of a large tract of real estate situated
in Wysox, Bradford county, Pa. There are several roads running
through their lands along which they had constructed post and
board fences, which for over twenty years they had been accustomed to whitewash. In the spring of 1881 they had erected a
new fence along one of these roads, on both sides of which they
owned the land, and in the months of June and July of that year
were engaged in whitewashing the same. The whitewash, a preparation of lime and salt mixed in boiling water, was prepared in a
heater in the hog-pen of the defendants, a distance from the nearest
point of the fence to be whitewashed of one hundred and thirty
rods. To get the whitewash to the fence for use a keg or barrel,
two feet three inches high and fifteen inches in diameter was placed
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upon a small four-wheeled wagon, the wheels of which were twelve
inches and fourteen inches in diameter. The length of the wagon
was three feet, and breadth two and a half feet. In the keg was a
shovel, the handle extending above the keg a distance differently
stated by the witnesses from a few inches to two or three feet.
The outside of the keg was streaked with lime, and it was covered
with a piece of canvas or dark carpet. The wagon, thus rigged,
was taken to the hog-pen, the keg filled with the prepared whitewash and then drawn to the place of use, and placed by the side of
the fence in the road convenient of access, and as the work progressed was drawn along the fence.
On the afternoon of Saturday, July 9th 1881, this barrel or keg
had been filled and taken to a point in this fence two hundred and
seventy-five rods from the hog-pen where the whitewash was prepared. At the close of the day it was still half full, and as the
workman intended to resume work on Monday morning, he covered
up the keg, and left it standing in the road. At this place the
road is forty-five and seven-tenths feet wide. On the side next
the fence being whitewashed there is a footpath from four to five
feet wide, elevated above the road a foot or more. Next is a ditch
about four feet wide and from four to five inches below the travelled
track.
The surface of the road is composed of small gravel; there
are no banks or dangerous places on this road at this point, or
above or below it. The truck and keg were placed in the ditch.
On Sunday, July 10th, Henry Waters and the plaintiff left
Towanda at four P. A[. for a pleasure drive. After driving about
fourteen miles they came, about eight P. M., to the point in the road
above described, where, the plaintiff alleges, the horse, becoming
frightened at the defendants' truck and lime keg, became unmanageable, reared up, plunged sideways and a little ahead, fell down
and died instantly. The wagon was overturned and the plaintiff
thrown under it, with its weight resting upon her, thereby causing
the injuries for which this action was brought.
The plaintiff offered to prove by several witnesses that the
obstacle above described tended to frighten horses. Objected to by
the defendant because the question did not embrace the words
"ordinarily well-broken and road-worthy horses." Objection overruled; exception taken. (First and third assignments of error.)
The plaintiff offered to prove other cases in which horses had
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been frightened at the same object in the same position. Objected
to by the defendants; objection overruled. (Second assignment of
error.)
The defendants called J. G. Dougherty as a witness, who testified that he had had experience with horses for over twenty years;
had owned quite a number, owned five at the time he was examined; had seen this horse shortly before his death the same afternoon,
and had observed and described his condition, and had seen him
immediately after his death. Defendants then asked him : "In
your opinion, of what did that horse die ?" Objected to by the
plaintiff; objection sustained; exceptions. (Fourth assignment of
error.)
Defendants then asked the witness the following question: 99In
your opinion, was that tub calculated, placed upon the road as it
was, to frighten an ordinarily well-broken road-worthy horse, or an
ordinarily quiet and well-broken horse ?" Objected to by plaintiff
because it is not sufficient that the obstacle might not have frightened an ordinarily well-broken horse, but that the plaintiff has the
right to the highway in such a condition that even skittish animals
may be employed without risk. Objection sustained. Exception.
(Fifth and sixth assignments of error.)
Robert Ferguson, another witness for the defendants, testified
that he had been a blacksmith for over fifty years, had "always
handled horses more or less since he was big enough," and had
seen horses frightened in various ways. He also testified that he
had seen horses fall and thrown to the ground frequently. Defendants then proposed to ask witness the question whether the fall of
this horse on its side straight out at full length could have killed
it upon this piece of ground. Objected to by plaintiff as incompetent. Objection sustained. Exception. (Seventh assignment
of error.)
Defendants then asked the same witness this question: "State
to us your opinion whether a horse could be frightened to death at
this object that was in the road." Objected to by plaintiff. Objection sustained. Exception. (Eighth assignment of error.)
The defendants also offered rebutting testimony to the effect that
the horses that had been frightened by this obstacle were skittish
horses. Objected to by the plaintiff. Objection sustained. Exception. (Ninth assignment of error.)
The court charged generally that the public had the right to the
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entire width of the highway, and to the use of it; and that if the jury
believed that this whitewash-barrel in this small cart or wagon was
an object likely to frighten horses and render public travel unsafe,
it .was negligence on tile part of the defendants to leave it in the
highway, and they were liable for any injury resulting from such
negligence. (Tenth to twenty-first assignments of errors, both
inclusive.)
The defendants also requested the court to charge that if the
horse behind which the plaintiff was riding at the time of receiving
the alleged injury was skittish, and in the habit of shying at objects
in the highway, and was not quiet and well broken, then the plaintiff cannot recover. Answer. "Refused. But if the horse was
skittish, the plaintiff must exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. If he did not exercise such care, then the want of it so
as to amount to contributory negligence is matter of defence, and
is upon the defence to show it." (Twenty-second assignment oferror.)
That the plaintiff cannot recover, because she was unlawfully on
the public road on Sunday. Refused. (Twenty-third assignment
of error.)
Yerdict for the plaintiff for $1868, and judgment thereon. De.
fendant took this writ of error.
TW. T. Davies and Williams (Angle and Ellsbree & Son, with
them), for the plaintiffs in error.
Rodney A. .ercur and John F. Sanderson (-Edward Overton,
Jr., with them), for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREEN, J.-The injury for which the present action was
brought was occasioned in a peculiar and unusual manner. The
plaintiff and another were riding in a carriage along a public road,
in the open country, at about eight o'clock in the evening of a day
in the month of July, when suddenly the horse drawing the carriage reared, plunged a few steps forward, fell to the ground on
the side of the road and instantly died. In falling he upset the
carriage, which fell upon the plaintiff and caused the injuries for
which the suit is brought. The falling and death of the horse
caused the overthrow of the carriage; but what was it that caused
the falling and death of the horse? This is perhaps the true
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problem of the controversy, but the cause does not seem to have
There was an
been tried with much reference to its solution.
object standing by the side of the road, and quite near to the
beaten track, at the place where the horse fell, and it seems to have
been assumed that the horse took fright at the sight of this object,
and this caused him to rear and fall and die. But this is an unsatisfactory theory. We do not know whether horses ever die from
mere fright. No evidence on the subject was received. Some
testimony was offered by the defendants to the effect that the horse
could not have died of fright, and that his death was due to some
other cause; but it was rejected by the learned court below, and
that rejection constitutes the substance of several assignments of
error. No post-mortem examination of the horse was made, and
the cause of justice was thus deprived of what might have proved
to be a most important aid in the determination of the catastrophe.
No experts in farriery were examined. No veterinary or other
medical authorities were invoked, and the case is really barren of
testimony from which a satisfactory theory of the animal's death
may be derived. It is notorious that horses, like human beings,
die suddenly, and of similar diseases. Indeed, one of the medical
witnesses testified to that effect in this case. If there were facts
which indicated that this horse died from some sudden attack of
disease, or opinions of intelligent witnesses to that effect, based
upon facts observed by themselves, we think they should have been
received in evidence. We think that both the witnesses, Dougherty
and Ferguson, gave evidence which sufficiently qualified them to
answer the questions proposed to them, but which were rejected.
Dougherty had had much experience with horses for twenty years,
had owned quite a number, owned five at the time he was examined; he had seen this horse shortly before his death, the same
afternoon, and had observed and described his condition; saw him
immediately after his death; saw the object which was supposed to
have frightened the horse, and testified as to whether it was calculated to frighten horses. In view of all this we think the questions
proposed tb be put to him should have been allowed, the first one
for the reasons above indicated, and the second for the reason here
after stated. Ferguson was a blacksmith, had shod horses of many
-different kinds for over fifty years; had always handled horses
"since he was big enough;" had seen horses frightened frequently;
it was offered to piove by him that he had seen horses fall, and
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thrown to the ground many times, and then to inquire whether the
mere fall of this horse could have killed him, having reference to
the ground where he fell, the witness having seen it. We think
he was sufficiently qualified to answer this question, and his opinion
should have been received, and also on the subject whether a horse
could have been frightened to death by the object at which this
horse was supposed to have taken fright. Had the horse run away,
and in that manner upset the carriage, there would have been more
force in the objections to this testimony. But such was not the
fact. He died instantly, and the cause which produced his death
probably occasioned his fall, and it was his fall that upset the carriage. Now, the actual physical fact or condition which produced
his death cannot be known ; and the moral condition, so to speak,
is a mere matter of theory which requires illustration by the opinions of persons having experience in such matters. For these
reasons we sustain the fourth, seventh and eighth assignments of
error.
Another question arose on the trial which is presented in s3veral
assignments. It relates to the character and qualities of the horse
against whose fright precautions are required. It was contended
by the defendant that the animal should be an ordinarily quiet and
well-broken horse. This was denied by the plaintiff, who contended
that an object should be such as would not frighten any kind of
horses, whether quiet and well-broken, or skittish and shy. The
court adopted the latter view, and refused to allow the defendants
to inquire whether the object in this case was calculated to frighten
an ordinarily quiet and well-broken horse, or an ordinarily wellbroken and road-worthy horse. The same idea was embodied in
the answers to points, and in the general charge, where the thought
was expressed in the more comprehensive form that if the object
was calculated to frighten horses, without any qualification as to
their disposition, it would be negligence to expose it to view. In
this we think there was error.
There is a certain right of property owners, which we will discuss
presently, to leave objects on or along a highway, in front of their
premises, temporarily, and for special purposes, and where that
right exists it is of equal grade, before the law, with the-right of
travellers to journey on the highway. Hence in such cases the
obligations of each class to the other are equal, and not superior,
the one to the other. Each is bound to ordinary care toward the
VOL. XX-III.-31
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other, in the exercise of their respective rights, but not to care
which is extraordinary. In the more particular application of this
doctrine to a case like the present, we think the correct rule is,
that a property owner who has a lawful right to expose an object
on or along a public highway, within view of passing horses, for a
temporary purpose, is bound only to take care that it shall not be
calculated to frighten ordinarily gentle and well-trained horses.
And this seems to be the tenor of the authorities in the cases in
which there has been a judicial expression on the subject. Thus,
in the case of Mallory v. Griffey, 4 Norris 275, which was an
action to recover damages resulting from the fright of a horse, occasioned by a large stone along the highway, our brother STERRET T
said: "It was claimed that the stone was an object calculated to
frighten an ordinarily quiet and well-trained horse, and that the
defendant was chargeable with negligence in leaving it on the highway. This presented a question of fact which was properly submitted
to the jury with the instruction that the plaintiffs could not recover
unless they ' found from the evidence that a stone or rock such as
was placed in or near the road by the defendant, was, in and of
itself, an object calculated to frighten an ordinarily quiet and wellbroken horse ' "
In Horse v. Bichmond, 41 Ver. 435, it was held that a town is
liable for such accidents by fright as are the natural result of its
neglect to remove any object of frightful appearance so remaining
deposited on the margin as to render the whole road unsafe for travel
with horses of ordinary gentleness. In _Poshay v. Glen Haven, 25
Wis. 288, the court said: "We adopt upon this subject the rule
established by the Supreme Courts of Vermont, New Hampshire
and Connecticut, that objects within the limits of a highway naturally calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, may
constitute such defect in the way as to render the town liable, even
when so removed from the travelled path as to avoid all danger of
collision."
In Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376, CARPENTER, J., said: "In
conclusion, wVe are satisfied that the law is and ought to be so that
objects within the limits of a highway which in their nature are
calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, may be nuisances, which make the highway defective within the meaning of
the statute."
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In Card v. Oity of -Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547, the court said:
"How far, if at all, the court would be inclined to admit the doctrine adopted in this discussion beyond the facts now before us, we
cannot now decide. But in no case like this can a liability of the
town exist, unless the object of fright presents an appearance that
would be likely to fr;ghten ordinary horses, nor unless the appearance of the object is such that it should be expected by the town
that it naturally might have that effect, nor unless the horse was at
least an ordinarily kind, gentle and safe animal, and well broken
for travelling upon our public roads." The rule is stated in the
same way in the cases cited by the defendant in error. Thus, in
Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N. H. 18, SMITH, J., says: "But if
objects are suffered to remain (except for the most temporary purposes) resting upon one spot, or confined within any phrticular
space, within the highway, *and are of such shape or character as
to be manifestly likely to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness,
injuries caused by the fright thus occasioned may properly be said
to happen by reason of the obstruction or insufficiency of the highway, unless the person placing or continuing those objects upon
the highway was, in so doing, making such use of the highway as
was under all the circumstances reasonable and proper." To the
same effect are Young v. New Haven, 39 Conn. 435; Dinock v.
Suffield, 30 Conn. 129.
It seems to us it would be difficult to state a rational rule on this
subject unless it is accompanied with this limitation. For if persons are bound to guard against frightening skittish, vicious, timid
and easily frightened horses, it will not be possible to state any
limit of precaution which will be a protection against liability.
The reason is that there is nothing as to which it can be definitely
said that such horses will not frighten. On this subject the language of our brother PAXS'ON, in the recent case of PittsburghSouthern Railway Co. v. Taylor, 15 Weekly Notes of Cases 37, and Leg.
Int. of Feb. 29th 1884, is particularly apposite. He said: "The
frightening of a horse is a thing that cannot be anticipated, and is
governed by no known rules. In many instances a spirited road
horse will pass in safety an obstruction that a quiet farm horse will
scare at. A leaf, a piece of paper, a lady's shawl fluttering in the
wind, a stone or a stump by the wayside, will sometimes alarm even
a quiet horse. I may mention, by way of illustration, that the
severest fright I ever knew a horse to feel, was caused by the sun-
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light shining in through the windows of a bridge upon the floor."
If a farmer may not have a barrel of cider, a bag of potatoes, a
horse power, a wheelbarrow or a wagon, standing on his own premises by the side of a highway, except at the risk of having his whole
estate swept away in an action for damages occasioned by the fright
of an unruly horse, the vocation of agriculture will become perilous
indeed. These views lead us to the conclusion that the court below
was in error in its treatment of this subject, and we therefore sustain the first, third, fifth, sixth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth and
fifteenth assignments. We see no objection to. allowing proof of
specific cases of fright at this particular object, and, therefore, do
not sustain the second assignment.
Another subject of complaint by the defendants is the restrained
and limited manner of defining the defendants' rights adopted by
the court, and their subordination, when stated, as rights of inferior
grade to those of the travelling public, and, therefore, to those of
the plaintiff. The defendants are farmers. They own a considerable body of land lying on both sides of the public road at the place
where the accident happened. For some time before and after the
accident they were engaged in whitewashing their fences, extending a considerable distance along the road. The road at this place
was upwards of forty-five feet in width, the road-bed actually travelled being twenty-two feet wide. The distance from the track to
the fence on the south side was thirteen and a half feet, and in this
space there was a slope downwards of two and nine-tenths feet, a
little steeper near the road than for the remainder of the distance.
The surface of the road and slope was composed of small gravel.
Next the fence was a raised footpath, about four and a half feet
wide, and next to the path was a ditch four feet wide and fourtenths of a foot below the travelled track. In this ditch stood a
small truck on wheels, about two and a half by three feet, the
wheels being twelve to fourteen inches high, and on the truck was
a small barrel about fifteen inches in diameter and two feet three
inches high. A pole or stick projected above it, the height of
which above .the barrel is differently stated by the witnesses from
a few inches to two or three feet, and a small piece of carpet covered
the pole and barrel. The outside of the barrel was streaked with
lime, and the barrel itself contained the lime with which the whitewashing was done. This is the object which, it is claimed for the
plaintiff, caused the horse to frighten, and thereby produced his
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fall and death. It was moved along the road as the work progressed, and was left standing in the ditch from Saturday inight to
Monday morning, covering the Sunday when the accident occurred,
partly filled with lime prepared for use.
The learned court did instruct the jury that the defendants had
the right to use any part of the highway for the purpose of building and improving their fence, provided they did not interfere with
the rights of travellers; and that, if the lime tub was calculated to
frighten horses, it would be negligence to use it, because all citizens
had a right to pass without having their horses frightened by any
obstruction placed on the highway. The learned judge also said that
the public had a right to travel over every part of the highway;
that everything between the fences was highway, and the public
had the right to use any part of it they saw fit. It seems to us this
is not a sufficiently precise designation of the relative rights of the
property owners and the public. As we understand the law, there
is an absolute right in the property owner to use a portion of the
public highway for certain purposes for a temporary period and in
a reasonable manner, and this right may be exercised in derogation
of the right of the travelling public. Thus, in 2 Dill. on Municipal
Corporations, § 581, the writer says: "We have heretofore shown
that the primary purpose of a street is for passage and travel, and
that unauthorized and illegal obstructions to its free use come
within the legal notion of a nuisance. But it is not every obstruction, irrespective of its character or purpose, that is illegal, even
although not sanctioned by any express legislative or municipal
authority. On the contrary, the right of the public to the free
and unobstructed use of a street or way is subject to reasonable and
necessary limitations. The carriage and delivery of fuel, grain,
goods, etc., are legitimate uses of a street, and may result in the
temporary obstruction to the right of public transit. So the improvement of the street or public highway itself may occasion
impediments to its uninterrupted use by the public. And so of
the improvements of adjoining lots by digging cellars, by building,
etc. ; this may occasion a reasonable necessity for using the street
or sidewalk for the deposit of material. Temporary obstructions
of this kind are not invasions of the public easement, but simply
incidents to, or limitations of it. They can be justified only when
and only so long as they are reasonably necessary."
In the case of Commonwealth v. Passmore, 1 S.& R., on p. 219,
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C. J., said: "No man has a right to throw wood or
stones into the street at his pleasure. But, inasmuch as fuel is
necessary, a man may throw wood into the street for the purpose
of having it carried to his house, and it may lie there a reasonable
time. So, because building is necessary, stone, bricks, lime, sand
and other materials may be placed in the street, provided it be done
in the most convenient manner."
The foregoing case was an indictment or a nuisance, where the
question was simply whether the obstruction in question was a
nuisance; but the case of Palmer v. Silverthorn, 8 Casey 65, was
an action to recover damages for the broken leg of an ox which bad
wandered among a parcel of building materials placed by the defendant in the highway in front of his premises while erecting a building.
Here a practical question of liability for damages arose, and it was
determined for the defendant, because, although his materials were
an obstruction to the street, they were lawfully there, and he was
not responsible if he left sufficient room for the travel of the street.
The case of Commonwealth v. Passmore, was cited and approved,
and a similar case from 1 Denio 524, was quoted, in which the
same doctrine was declared. THOmpSON, J., said the necessity of
the case was probably the foundation of the rule, " but the practice
has become a custom of such long standing that it is regarded as
law, and the right will not be defeated by an investigation into the
necessity of so doing in any particular case. It is a right to be exercised under responsibility for all injury arising from an unreasonable
or negligent use of it." In Mallory v. G-riffey, supra, which was
an action for damages for an injury inflicted by a horse taking fright
at a stone placed in the highway as a part of some building materials to be presently used, we affirmed the court below in charging
that the defendant was not liable, although the horse took fright,
merely because the stone was in the highway. Mr. Justice STERRETT said: "The jury were properly instructed that the defendant
might place building material on a portion of the highway, and
permit the same to remain there for a reasonable length of time for
the purpose of erecting his barn on the line of the road, without, on
that account alone, incurring liability for injuries sustained by persons passing along the road, provided ample room was left for the
free passage of vehicles and animals; but he would be liable
for injuries occasioned by an unreasonable or negligent use of the
highway." All this doctrine was repeated by the present Chief
TILGHM3AN,
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Justice in the case of City of Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 14 iNorris
287, who further said: "But the right to partially obstruct a street
does not appear to be limited to a case of strict necessity ; it may
extend to purposes of convenience or ornament, provided it does
not unreasonably interfere with public travel."
The substance of the doctrine is that the mere exercise of the
right of obstruction for a lawful purpose, imposes no liability to
pay for damages resulting therefrom. It must be an unreasonable
or negligent exercise of the right, in order to impose liability. To
say that a man may lawfully deposit bricks and lumber on the highway, in front of a lot on which he is erecting a building with those
materials, and yet if their presence has a tendency to frighten
horses, and some over-sensitive horse does take fright at them and
runs away and causes damage, the person depositing the materials
is guilty of negligence, and shall pay the damage, is merely giving
a right with one breath and taking it all away with another. In
practical effect such a right would be no right at all. Any pile
of bricks, stones, sand, lumber, or other building material, in a
street, has a tendency to frighten horses, and in almost any community there could always be found some horses that would actually
take fright at seeing them. But that circumstance alone will not
take away the right to deposit them in such a place. There must
be some abuse of the right, some unusual and extraordinary mode
of arranging the materials, such as will probably produce fright
with ordinary gentle and well-trained horses, before it can be fairly
said liability arises. So in the present case. The defendants were
whitewashing their fences-a perfectly proper and legitimate thing
to do. The fence extended along a great length of the public road,
and the process of whitewashing necessarily occupied considerable
time. In this respect there does not seem to be anything unreasonable in the case. They used a small barrel to contain their
material, the whole size of the vessel and its supporting truck not
exceeding two and a half feet by three feet superficially, and three
feet perpendicularly. It is difficult to see anything unreasonable
or negligent in using such an apparatus. It stood by the side of
the travelled track, and made no encroachment upon it of any kind.
It therefore did not obstruct the highway so as to interfere with the
travel upon it. It seems to us the jury should have been told that
unless there was something of an unusual and extraordinary character in the structure and appearance of this apparatus which would
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naturally tend to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness and training, it was not negligence to use it, and its reasonable use for no
longer time than was fairly required, along the highway, in whitewashing the defendants' fences, would not subject defendants to
liability, even though some horses might or did take fright at seeing it.

These views require us to sustain, as we do, the tenth, eleventh,
twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth,
twentieth and twenty-first assignments. We do not sustain the
twenty-second, because it is of too limited a scope to cover all
the conditions of liability; nor the twenty-third, because the presence of the plaintiff on the road on Sunday is not a defence which
can be set up by a private citizen against a possible liability, if
established by the other facts of the case: .1ohney v. Cook, 2 Casey
342 ; Baneh v. Lloyd, 7 Id. 369. We sustain the ninth assignment, for the reason that evidence being -admissible to show the
frightening of particular horses at sight of this object, it is competent to show that those horses were not of ordinary gentleness and
training.
Judgment reversed and venire de nevo awarded.
Temporarily Obstructinq a Street.With regard to obstructing a street, the
law in l'!.'x v. Russell, 6 East 427, is

very well stated: "That

the primary

object of a street is for the free passage
of the public, and anything which impeded that free passage, without necessity, was a nuisance ; that if the nature
of the defendant's business was such as
to require the loading and unloading
of so many r.more of his wagons than
could be conveniently contained within
his own private premises, he must either
enlarge his premises or remove his business to some more convenient spot."
In a Pennsylvania case it was said:
"Necessity justifies actions which would
otherwise be nuisances. This necessity
need not he absolute ; it is enough if it
be reasonable. No man has a right to
throw wood or stones into the street
at pleasure; but inasmuch as fuel is necessary, a man may throw wood into the
street for the purpose of having it car-

tied to his house, and it may lie there a
reasonable time. So, because building
is necessary, stone, brick, lime, sand
and other materials may be placed in the
street, provided it be done in the most
convenient manner:" Commonwealth v.
Passmore, 1 S.& R. 217; approved in
People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio 524,
530, and in Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St.
358, 374. Such instances as those
enumerated in the Pennsylvania case, it
is said in the Ohio case, "are not invasion of, but simply incident to, or rather
qualification of, the right of transit; the
limitation upon them is that they must
not be unnecessarily and unreasonably interposed or prolonged."
In a Massachusetts case it -was said:
"What may be deemed a reasonable and
proper use of a way, public or private,
must depend much on the local situation,
and much on public usage. The general
use and acquiescence of the public is evidence of the right. The owner of land
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may make such reasonable use of a way
adjoining his land as is usually made by
others similarly situated. As to the reasonableness of the use, it may well be
laid down that in a populous town where
land is very valuable, it is riot unreasonable to erect buildings and fences on the
line of the street, and to place doors and
gates in them so ds when opened to
swing over the street. When the owner
of a lot in such a situation has occasion
to build, and, for that purpose, to dig
cellars, he may rightfully lay his building materials and earth within the limits
of the street, provided he takes care not
improperly to obstruct the same, and to
remove them within a reasonable time,
It is very obvious that, without this
privilege, it would be, in some situations,
nearly or quite impracticable to build at
all :" O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292,
297. Thus, in an action for special damages against the author of an obstruction,
it was held that a street of a city may be
obstructed by placing material for building in it for a reasonable time and so as
to occasion the least inconvenience, if,
from a want of room elsewhere, it be
reasonably necessary to deposit in the
street; and a plea is defective which does
not aver or show this reasonable neCessity, as it cannot be judicially inferred
from the fact that the building was being
erected in a populous city: Wood v.
M31ears, 21 Ind. 515.
In addition to the cases already cited,
the following cases support the doctrine
of the principal case and the cases already
cited in this note: Rex v, Jones, 3 Camp.
229; Rex v. Ward, 4 A. & E. 405;
Rex v, Cross, 3 Camp. 226; St. John
v. New York, 3 Bosw. 483; (Vine v.
Cornwall, 21 Grant (Canada) 142.
A street or sidewalk cannot be habitually used for delivery of distillery slops
through pipes: People v. Cunningham, I
Denio 529 ; or for wagons continually
standing to receive goods: Rex v. Russell, 6 East 427 ; or receiving barrels
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from a cider press : Dennis v. Sipperly,
.37 Hun 69 ; or for sawing timber, Rex
v. Jones, 3 Camp. 230 , nor can a person obstruct a street With carriages, even
where he has been in the habit of so
doing for a long time: Gerring v. Barfield, 16 0, B. (N. Si) 597 ; nor can a
stage-coach stand in a street to ply for
passengers, although it may so stop to
put down or take up passengers: Rex v.
Cross, 8 Camp. 224.
In the case of a stage coach it was held
that if it stopped for an unreasonable
time on a public highway, in front of
and obstructing the entrance to a campmeeting groundi it might lawfully be
"moved on" by the person in charge
of the ground. The court said : "Persons have a right to travel over public
streets and roads, stopping only for
necessary purposes, and then only for a
reasonable time,
Stage coaches may
stop to set down and take up passengers,
as this is necessary for public convenience ; but this must be done in a reasonable time. A person travelling on
the highway must do so in such a way
as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to
impede the exercise of the same right
by others; and if he does not exercise
this right in a reasonable manner, he is
guilty of a nuisance [citing authorities].
The proof in this case clearly shows that
the coach of the appellee, by remaining
in the highway, under the circumstances
as testified to by nearly all the witnesses
on both sides, obstructed the travel over
it for an unreasonable time, and was a
public nuisance. Without stopping to
inquire whether any one whose rights
are not injured or interfered with by a
public nuisance may abate it, about
which there is some conflict in the docisions, there can be no doubt whatever
that any person whose rights are injured
or interfered with may abate it, provided
its abatement does pot involve a breach
of the peace :" Turner v. floltzman, 54
Md. 148.
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In State v. Edens, 85 N. C. 522, the
defendant was indicted in a common-law
indictment with maintaining a nuisance
by obstructing a street in that he kept a
market cart in the street for an hour and
a half, and the jury rendered a special
verdict finding that he was notified to
remove the same, but refused; that he
and a number of other persons were
accustomed to occupy places on the street
with their carts, selling vegetables, etc.,
but that it 3wms contrary to the municipal regulations, and that notwithstanding the alleged obstruction, there was
the usual passing of vehicles and footpassengers. It was held not to be per se
a nuisance.

A temporary obstruction does not
amount to such an obstruction as subjects the person placing it there, in all
cases, to an action liable. Thus, a
temporary and necessary use, such as
the delivery of barrels from cars on skids
across a sidewalk, is permissible, provided a sufficient space is left on the other
side of the roadway: Mathews v. Kelsey,
58 Me. 56 ; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 248.
In Goldsmith v. .Tones, 43 How. Pr.
415, the plaintiffs, who occupied a store
adjoining the defendant's, built a box
around a telegraph pole, projecting two
and a half feet on the sidewalk, using it
as a sign ; the defendant obliterated the
name on the side, and this was held to
be a malicious trespass. The court went
further, and said that the only allowable
act of abating would be the removal of
the box, and this could not be justified
unless it specially incommoded the defendant in his use of the street or sidewalk.
Distributing hand-bills on the street
whereby a crowd was gathered, was held
not indictable: Rex v. Sarmon, I Burr
516. Where a village ordinance provided that the sidewalk in frornt of
certain stores should be fourteen feet
wide, and that the outside ten feet should
be of uniform grade and kept clear of
all obstructions, but the inside four feet

were left ungraded and were occupied
for stairways, show-tables, etc., by the
owners of the stores, and plaintiff, within
the four feet in front of one of the stores,
and by the authority of the owner, kept a
fruit and candy stand, itwas held that the
stand was not an obstruction to the sidewalk, and the plaintiff was not liable to
arrest by a peace officer for keeping the
same, although a crowd may have collected in front of it so as to obstruct the
street: Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307.
But a person is a trespasser who, instead
of passing along on the sidewalk of a
street, stops in front of a man's house,
and remains there, using towards him
abusive and insulting language: Adams
v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390. Nor may he
warn the public from another's shop,
or with a placard inscribed "Beware of
Mock Auctions :" Gilbert v. Mickle, 4
Sandf. Ch. 357. Nor has any one a
right to display such goods or signs in
his shop windows, or to collect a constant
crowd on the sidewalk, obstructing public
travel-for instance, satirical effigies :
Rex v. Carlile, 6 C. & P. 628 ; nor can
a constable hold an auction : Com. v
Milliman, 13 S. & R. 403; Com.v. Passmore, supra.
So a wooden awning in front of a store
is not per se a nuisance. The court said:
"Hawkins, who owns a hotel building
in Ypsilanti, filed his bill to restrain the
defendant, who owns a neighboring store
building, from maintaining a wooden
awning in front of his premises. The
complainant's theory seemed to be that
this is a public nuisance which injuriously affects him specially. The awning
is, so far as we can see, no more of a
nuisance than it would have been if
made from any other material, and it was
not, as shown from the evidence, such a
structure as any court would regard as
a -public injury or grievance. It was
such as was used habitually in Ypsilanti
as well as elsewhere, and was recognised
by the city ordinance as not objectionable. It was, therefore, no more than a
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lawful use of defendant's own property.
The speqial grievance complained of is
simply that it obstructed the view of the
sidewalk and a portion of the street.
The testimony does not indicate that
there was any very well founded objection in fact to the awning, and there is
no legal objection to it :" Hawkins v.
&umders, 45 Mich. 491.
But a fruit stand, a permanent structure three feet'eleven inches wide, seven
feet high and twenty-three feet long, on
the inside of a sidewalk fifteen feet wide,
is a nuisance per se: State v. Berdetta,
73 Ind. 185; s.c. 38 Am. Rep. 117;
20 Amer. L. Reg. 342; Com. v. Wentworth, Brightly's Rep. (Penn.) 318. See
Echols v. State, 12 Tex. App. 615. So
placing large quantities of stone in a
public highway is indictable: Com. v.
King, 13 Met 115; or keeping a cart
and machinery for the purpose of taking
photographic sketches: Queen v. Davis,
24 U. P. Can. C. P. 575 ; or a projecting show-board: Read v. Terrett, L. R.,
1 Ex. Div. 349. See Original Harilepool Collieries Co. v. Gibb, L. R., 5 Ch.
Div. 713.
So a railway company cannot turn a
street into a car-yard: Vars v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 23 U. P. Canada (C.
P.) 143. So if a street railway unreasonably uses a street in front of a lot for
switching and storing cars to the injury
of the owner of the lot, such owner may
maintain an action therefor: Mahady v.
Bushwick Rd. Co., 91 N. Y. 148 ; s.c.
43 Am. Rep, 661.
A horse unlawfully at large on a highway is a nuisance, and its owner is liable for any damages done by it, whether
the animal is vicious or not: Baldvin v.
Ensign, 49 Conn. 113; 8. c. 44 Amer.
Rep. 205.
Objects Frightening Horses.-Thequotations from cases of frightening horses
are unusually full, and no other need be
made. A few instances will be cited.
The plaintiff's horse became frightened

by a rock in the defendant's highway in
a situation calculated to frighten horses,
and the plaintiff in attempting to dismount was injured. It was held that if
the horse was unmanageable, and the
plaintiff was dismounting to avoid danger, the defendant was liable, but if the
horse was manageable, and the plaintiff
dismounted to avoid apprehended difilculty, the defendant was not liable ; and
further that the defendant was liable for
the injury occurring from the fright of
the horse at the rock, although neither
the horse nor the carriage came into contact with the rock, the horse being ordinarily safe and gentle : Card v. City of
Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547; s.c. 20 Amer.
Rep. 722. But see Agnew v. Corunna,
21 N. W. Rep. 873.
A town is not liable for damages sustained by a traveller from the fright of
his horse at meeting cows in the road
with boards on their horns, and also from
a defect in the way ; the combined action
of both cases operating to produce. the
accident: Perkins v. Inhabitants of Payette, 68 Me. 152 ; s. o.28 Am. Rep.
84; see Moulton v. Sandford, 51 Me.
127.
Where a horse seared and shied at a
hole in a turnpike, the company was held.
liable : Brooksville, 4-c., Co. v. Painphrey
59 Ind. 78; a. c. 26 Amer. Rep. 76.
If a city allows wild animals exhibited
in the streets, it is liable if they frighten
horses which run away and do damage
to their owner: Littlev. City of Madison,
42 Wis. 643; s.c. 24 Am. Rep. 435.
"A hollow, black and burnt log" was
held to entitle to a recovery under certain
circumstances: Foshay v. Town of Glen
Haven, 25 Wis. 288; s.c. 3 Amer. Rep.
73; so the blowing of a steam-whistle
of a factory near a highway: Knight v.
Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufac
turing Co., 38 Conn. 438; a. c.9 Am.
Rep. 406 ; Parker v. Union Woollen Co.,
42 Conn. 399.
A steam traction engine, or roadster,
is nota nuisance per se when used on a
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public highway: .M1acomber v. Nicholls,
34 Mich. 212; s. C. 22 Am. Rep. 522;
and the one using it is not liable at all
unless it would fi-ighten ordinary horses:
Vatkins v. Reddin, 2 F. & F. 629 ; see
Smith v. Stokes, 4 B. & S. 84, and Harrison v. Leaper, 5 L. T. (N. S.) 640;
See Turner v. Buchanan, 82 Ind. 147 ;
s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 485; nor a company
for cars running over a bridge across a
highway: Favor v. Boston 4- Lowell Rd.
Co., 114 Mass. 350; s. c. 19 Am. Rep.
364. There is a liability, however, for
leaving a stcami roller over Sunday on
the highway : Young v. New 11aven, 39

Conn. 435 ; see Harrisv. Ilobbs, 3 Ex.
Div. 268; s. c. 31 Moak 252.
But a tent in the highway is such an
object as to frighten horses of ordinary
gentleness: Ayer v. City of Norwich, 39
Conn. 376 ; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 396 ; so
a derrick used by a railroad company:
Jones v. Housatonic Rd. Co., 107 Mass.
261. See Howardv. North Bridqewater,
16 Pick. 189; Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen
552; Kinysbury v. Dedham, 13 Id.
186 ; Lawrence v. M3ft. Vernon, 35 31e.
100; J"ewett v. Gage, 55 Id. 538.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
MOORE v. MONROE

ET AL.

An injunction will not be granted to restrain the reading or repeating of the
Bible, or parts thereof, or the singing of religious songs, in a school, at the suit of a
tax-payer whose children are not required to be present during such exercises.
Section 1764 of the Iowa Code, providing that "the Bible shall not be excluded
from any school or institution in the state, nor shall any pupil be required to read it,
contrary to the wishes of his parent or guardian," is not in violation of article 1,
3, of the bill of rights.

from Davis District Court.
The plaintiff, as a resident and tax-payer of the independent district of Bloomfield, and patron of the public school taught in the
district, brings this suit against the teachers of the school and
directors of the district, and prays for an injunction to prevent the
reading or repeating of the Bible, or any part thereof, in the school,
and to prevent the singing of religious songs in the school. The
court refused to grant an injunction, and from the order of refusal
plaintiff appeals.
APPEAL

P. W. Moore and 3. NV. Steele, for appellant.
S. S. Carruthersand Payne p Ficlhelberger,for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADAMS, J.-The record shows that the teachers of the school are
accustomed to occupy a few minutes each morning in reading selec-
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tions from the Bible, in repeating the Lord's prayer, and singing
religious songs; that the plaintiff has two children in the school,
but that they are not required to be present during the time thus
occupied. The record further shows that the plaintiff objected to
such exercises, and requested that they be discontinued ; but the
teachers refused to discontinue them, and the directors refused to
take-any action in the matter.
The plaintiff concedes that under a statute of Iowa, section
1764 of the Code, if constitutional, neither the school directors nor
courts have power to exclude the Bible from public schools. The
provision of the statute is in these words: "The Bible shall not be
excluded from any school or institution in this state, nor shall any
pupil be required to read it contrary co the wishes of his parent or
guardian." Under this provision, it is a matter of individual option
with school teachers as to whether they will use the Bible in school
or not, such option being restricted only by the provision that no
pupil shall be required to .read it contrary to the wishes of his
parent or guardian. It was doubtless thought by the legislature
that an attempt on the part of school boards to exclude, by official
action, the Bible from schools, would result in unseemly controversies, to be decided ultimately at the polls, and that such controversies
would naturally disturb the harmony of school districts, and impair
the efficiency of schools. Whether the provision is a wise one, it is
unnecessary for us to express any opinion. It is the law of the
state, unless unconstitutional.
The plaintiff insists, however, that it is unconstitutional. The
provision of the constitution which it is said to conflict with is
article 1, § 8, bill of rights. The provision is in these words:
"The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall
any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes,
taxes, or other rates for building or repairing places of worship, or
the maintenance of any minister or ministry."
The plaintiff's position is that, by the use of the school-house as
a place for reading the Bible, repeating the Lord's prayer, and
singing religious songs, it is made a place of worship; and so his
children are compelled to attend a place of worship, and he, as a
tax-payer, is compelled to pay taxes for building and repairing
a place of worship.
We can conceive that exercises like those described might be
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adopted with other views than those of worship, and possibly they
are in the case at bar; but it is hardly to be presumed that this is
wholly so. For the purposes of the opinion it may be conceded
that the teachers do not intend to wholly exclude the idea of worship. It would follow, from such concession, that the school-house
is, in some sense, for the time being, made a place of worship
But it seems to us that if we should hold that it is made a place of
worship within the meaning of- the constitution, we should put a
very strained construction upon it. The object of the provision, we
think, is not to prevent the casual use of a public building as a
place for offering prayer, or doing other acts of religious worship,
but to prevent the enactment of a law whereby any person can be
compelled to pay taxes for building or repairing any place designed
to be used distinctively as a place of worship. The object, we think,
was to prevent an improper burden.
It is, perhaps, not to be denied that the principle, carried out to
its extreme logical results, might be sufficient to sustain the appellant's position; yet we cannot think that the people of Iowa, in
adopting the constitution, had such extreme view ih mind. The
burden of taxation by reason of the casual use of a public building
for worship, or even such stated use as that shown in the case at
bar, is not appreciably greater. We do not think, indeed, that the
plaintiff's real objection grows out of the matter of taxation. We
infer from his arguments that his real objection is that the religious
exercises are made a part of the educational system, into which his
children must be drawn or made to appear singular, and perhaps
be subjected to some inconvenience. But, so long as the plaintiff's
children are not required to be in attendance at the exercises, we
cannot regard the objection as one of great weight. Besides, if
we regarded it as of greater weight than we do, we should have
to say that we do not find anything in the constitution or law upon
which the plaintiff can properly ground his application for relief.
Possibly, the plaintiff is a propagandist, and regards himself charged
with a mission to destroy the influence of the Bible. Whether this
be so or not, it is sufficient to say that the courts are charged with
no such mission.
We think that the injunction was properly denied.
Affirmed.
Neither the Federal government nor
any state government can make any law

respecting an establishment of religion:
Const. U. S., Amend. I ; 2 Kent's Coin.
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35 et se.; Rawle on Const. 121; Story
on Const., sec. 1879 ; Reynolds v.U. S.,
98 U. S. 145, and the state constitutions
generally. An ordinance giving a special
privilege to one sect infringes this principle: Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. An. 671.
Nor can either State or Federal government compel attendance upon religious
worship, nor hinder the free exercise of
religious belief and expression: Cooley
Const. Lim. 470, et seg. But a law is
not unconstitutional because it forbids
what one may conscientiously think right
or requires what one may conscientiously
think wrong: Donahoe v. Richards, 38
Me. 376 ; Ferriterv. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 ;
Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145.
Nor can either government, as a general rule, impose any tax for religious
purposes ; but otherwise in New Hampshire : Const., pt. 1, art. 6 ; and see,
also, Barnes v. First Parish, 6 Mass.
401.
It has been said that "religion
and religious worship are not so placed
under the ban of the constitution that
they may not be allowed to become the
recipient of any incidental benefit whatsoever from the public bodies or authorities
of the state." And the use of a schoolhouse for religious meetings, when not
required for school purposes, is'not unconstitutional: Nichols v. School Direct61 ; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 160 ;
ors, 93 Ill.
Townsend v. Hagan, 35 Iowa 195 ; Davis v. Boqet, 50 Id.11. But it has been
held, on the other hand, that such use is
not allowable: Spencer v. School Dist.,
15 Kan. 259; s. a. 22 Am. Rep. 268;
Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301 ; School
Dist. v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657 ; Scofield
v. School Dist., 27 Conn. 499. And in
Ohio, that they have no power to lease
it for holding a select school: Weir v.
Day, 35 Ohio St. 143.
The powers of school boards are limited to those expressly granted and those
resulting by necessary implication from
those granted : Stevenson v. School Directors, 87 Ill. 255; Wells v. People, 71
Id. 532; Clark v. School Directors, 78
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Id. 474; Peers v. Bd. of Ed., 72 Id
508; School Directors v. Fogleman, 76
Id. 189 : State v. Omaha, 7 Neb. 267 ;
Gelding v. School Dist., 10 Id. 239 ; Manning v. Van Buren, 28 Ia. 332; Bank
v. Cojfln's Grove, 51 Id. 350; Adams
v. State, 82 Ill.132; State v. Bd. of
Ed., 35 Ohio St. 368. They have
power to dismiss or exclude a pupil from
school, when necessary to maintain good
order and government: Stephenson v.
Hall, 14 Barb. 222 ; Sewell v. Bd. of
Ed. 29 Ohio 89; Hodgkins V.Rockpo7t,
105 Mass. 475 ; Ferriter v. Tyler, 48
Vt. 444; Bd. of Ed. v. Thompson,
33 Ohio St. 321 ; Burdick v. Babcock,
31 Ia. 562 ; .2lurphy v. Directors, 30
Id. 429 ; Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick.
226. And are not liable for an error in
judgment in so doing: Dritt v. Shodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 ; McCormick v. Burt,
95 I1. 263; Donahoe v. Richards, 38
Me. 376. They have general power to
make rules for the government of the
school, but such rules must be reasonable: Sherman v. Charleston, 8 Cush.
160 ; Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 225 ;
TIard v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 ; Donahoe v.
Richards, 38 Me. 376 ; Roe v. Demng,
21 Ohio St. 66; Rulison v. Post, 79 II1.
567 ; School Trustees v. People. 87
303. What are reasonable rules is
Ill.
a question of law: Tlompson v. Beaver,
63 Ill. 353. In some states a rule requiring pupils to pursue particular studies
is considered reasonable : Sewell v. Bd.
of Ed., 29 Ohio St. 89 : Guernsey v.
Pitkin, 32 Vt. 225 ; and in State v. Miner, 50 Iowa 145; s. c. 32 Am. Rep.
128, it was held that while a pupil may
not be chastised for not pursuing a study
to which the parent objects, le may be
expelled. In Illinois and Wisconsin, on
the other hand, it is held that a pupil
cannot be required to pursue a study
when the parents request that he he excased from so doing: School Trustees v.
People, 87 Ill. 303; Rulison v. Post, 79
Id. 567 ; Morrow v. FVood, 35 Wis. 59;
s. a. 17 Am. Rep. 471.

BLANDY v. HALL.
A rule requiring the school to be parents and spiritual adviser that pupils
opened with religious exercises, where be excused from school to attend religious
attendance upon such exercises is not exercises will furnish no valid excuse for
obligatory, has elsewhere been held to such absence, and that for such absence
be a reasonable rule ; and during such pupils may be excluded from the school:
exercises all pupils may be required to Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444. As to
lay aside their books, observe good at- general power to expel for absence, see
tention, and bow the head during prayer: Burdick v. BaIbock, 31 Iowa 562 ; King
Spiller v. Ifoburn, 12 Allen 127 ; .lcCor- School Bd., 71 Mo. 628 ; s.c. 36 Am.
mick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263. Some deci- Rep. 499 ; Bussell v. Lynn ield, 116
sions have gone further, and have held Mass. 365.
that pupils may be required to read the
While the decisions in some of the
Bible, as a school exercise, even against cases cited seem to carry the principle to
the protest of the parents: Donahoe v. an unnecessary extent, that laid down
Richards, 38 Me. 376 ; Vall v. Cooke, in the principal case seems reasonable,
7 Am. Law Reg. (O.'S.) 417.
and we have been unable to find any
It is, however, equally competent for authorities holding an opposite view.
the school board to exclude the Bible See 2 Kent's Com. *196, note "j," latfrom the school where its presence is not ter part ; 2 Story on Const., sec. 1871,
expressly required by law: Bd. of Ed. 1873.
v. Miner, 23 Ohio St. 211.
M. D. EwEL.
Chicago.
It has been held that a request from

Supreme Court of Ohio.
BLANDY'S ADMINISTRATOR v. HALL & CO.
Mortgages invalid against the creditors of a mortgagor are invalid against his
assignee for the benefit of creditors.
The lien of such a mortgage is not preserved by a clause in the assignment excepting from its operation all existing liens and providing that such liens shall not be
affected thereby.
Where a statute requires the entry, on a chattel mortgage, of a certain statement,
a defect in such statement cannot be cured by conditions contained in the mortgage
but not referred to in the statement.

EROR to the District Court of Washington County.
On the 9th of February 1867, John L. Taylor executed to Henry
Blandy a chattel mortgage on certain property therein described,
to indemnify Blandy as surety for Taylor on certain indebtedness
therein specified. On this mortgage was entered a statement verified under oath as follows:
STATE OF OHIo, MUSKINGUM COUNTY, ss.
Henry Blandy, mortgagee, being duly sworn, upon his oath
says that the within-named mortgagor, John L. Taylor, is indebted
"THE
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to him in the sum of $1030, with interest; that the said claim is
just and unpaid; and that to secure the payment of the same, the
within mortgage has been executed to him in good faith.
HENRY BLANDY."

On the 81st of March and the 16th of April, respectively, Taylor
executed to Blandy other chattel mortgages, similar in all respects
to the foregoing, except as to names, dates, amounts and description
of property. These several mortgages were duly filed.
On the 19th of April 1877, Taylor executed to one Alexander
Johnson a deed of assignment for the benefit of his reditors, describing certain property, real and personal. This deed contains the
following clause :
" This conveyance includes all the real and personal property
owned by me, whether specifically described herein or not, excepting from the operation of this assignment all existing liens, which
are not to be affected hereby; excepting therefrom and saving and
reserving to the said John L. Taylor his homestead, and all other
rights and property to which he'may be entitled iinder the homestead exemption or other laws of Ohio."
This deed was duly filed in the probate court, in Muskingum
county, and subsequently Henry Blandy was appointed trustee for
the benefit of creditors in the place of Alexander Johnson,
assignee.
Henry Blandy, as successor of Johnson, converted the assigned
property, including the chattels embraced in the foregoing mortgages, into money, and filed in the probate court his account,
claiming a credit of $1082.78 on account of moneys paid as surety
for Taylor, under the chattel mortgages aforesaid.
The probate court allowed the credit claimed by Blandy, holding
the mortgages to be valid liens against the general creditors of the
assignor.
The creditors, Benedict, Hall & 'Co. and others, appealed from
this judgment to the Court of Common Pleas, Muskingum county,
where the preference of Blandy's mortgages over the claims of general creditors was denied. The judgment of the Common Pleas, on
error, was affirmed by the District Court.
Moses M. Granger and A. W. Train, for plaintiffs in error.
John King, T. J. Taylor and J. T. Crew, for defendant in error.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Two questions are presented in this case: 1. In
the administration of the assigned estate, did the mortgage of
Blandy have priority over the claims of other creditors ? 2. If not,
did the exception of liens in the deed of assignment give precedence
to !Blandy over the other creditors ?
1. At the time these mortgages were executed it was provided
by statute that every mortgage of goods and chattels shall be absolutely void, as against the creditors of the mortgagor, unless the
mortgagee, his agent or attorney, "in case the said instrument shall
have been given to indemnify the mortgagee against a liability as
surety for the mortgagor, shall enter thereon a true statement of
such liability, and that said instrument was taken in good faith
to indemnify, against any loss that may result therefrom," &c. . S.
& C. 475, § 1, and 66 Ohio L. 345, § 2.
In Hanes v. Tiffany, 25 Ohio St. 549, it was held that the omission to enter upon a chattel mortgage the statement required by
the statute, renders the mortgage void as against the creditors of
the mortgagor, and a mortgage void as to creditors is void as against
the assignee for the benefit of creditors. But, in Gardinerv. Parmalee, 31 Ohio St. 551, it was held where the affidavit (statement)
refers to matters contained in the mortgage, the matters thus referred
to are to be regarded as part of the affidavit (statement). These
cases are referred to and approved in Yesbit v. Wortz, 37 Ohio St.
378, and, we think, are conclusive on the question now under consideration. These mortgages of Blandy were given to indemnify
him against a liability as surety for the mortgagor. This fact is
stated in the mortgages, but such statement is not entered on the
mortgage nor verified by the affidavit of the mortgagee, nor is it
referred to in the affidavit. The statement in the affidavit simply
is that the mortgagor is indebted to the mortgagee in the sum
named; that the said claim is just and unpaid; and that to secure
the payment of the same, the within mortgage has been executed to
him in good faith. This is not a true statement of the liability
as surety against which the mortgage purports to be indemnity,
and no reference is made in the affidavit to any matter that can
supply the omission.
We admit that a substantial complianice with the requirement of
the statute is sufficient. What does the statute require? That the
McILVArnE,
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mortgagee shall state, under oath, what the liability is for which
he is bound as surety, and the mortgage was given in good faith to
indemnify him against loss as surety from such liability. The affidavit states the mortgagor is indebted to the affiant, and that the
mortgage was given in good faith to secure the payment of 'such
debt. No reference is made to the contents of the mortgage, and
for that reason we think the mortgage is void as against the
creditors of the mortgagor.
2. As to the next question. The deed of assignment "excepts
from the operation of the assignment all existing liens which are
not to be affected thereby." By no fair interpretation of this
clause can it be said that the assignor intended to except from the
operation of the assignment his equity of redemption in the mortThe assigned estate was administered on the
gaged property.
theory that the equity of redemption passed to the assignee for
the benefit of creditors. What, then, was the purpose of this
clause ? We think there can be no doubt that the intention was
to secure the mortgagees the full amount of their liens to the extent
that such liens were valid as against the assignor.
Can such purpose be accomplished by such means? We think not
Undoubtedly these mortgages were valid as against the assignor,
but void as against his creditors. By the assignment the rights
of creditors passed to the assignee as matter of law. The possession of the assignee was the possession of creditors. The right
of creditors to seize the property in the hands of the assignee did
not exist, but the assignee was bound, in law, to administer the
trust for their b.enefit, Every right which the creditors might have
asserted against the. property before the assignment, the assignee is
bound to secure for their benefit after the assignment. Liens invalid
as against creditors at the time of assignment remain invalid. These
mortgages were void as against creditors at the time of the assignment, unless they were made valid by the clause of the deed of
assignment now under consideration. The validity or invalidity
of an alleged lien is a question of law. It does not depend on the
will of the grantor in an alleged mortgage. This clause neither
validated nor invalidated the mortgage in any respect; nor did it
except or assume to except from the operation of the assignment
the mortgaged property. The property was assigned subject to
the liens .upon it, and it is the law, not the dictation or convention
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of the parties which determines the validity of the liens, and against
whom they exist.
Judgment
affirmed.
JOHNSON,

0. J., took no part in the decision.

SUBJECT TO WsAT.
SGNEE TAKES.
-As a general proposition, an assignee
for the benefit of creditors takes the
property subject to all prior equities :
Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. 1. .8; Moody
v. Sitton, 2 Ired. Eq. 382 ; Codwise v.
Gelston, 10 Johns. 507 ; Haggerty v.
Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. 437 ; Frow v.
Dowman, 11 Ala. 880 ; Reed v. Sands,
37 Barb. 185; Leger v. Bonaffe, 2 Id.
475; Addison v. Burckmyer, 4 Sandf.
Ch. 498; Stow v. Yarwood, 20 Ill. 497 ;
Goodwin v. Mix, 38 Id. 115 ; Griffin v.
Marquordt, 17 N. Y. 28 ; Plunkett v.
Carew, I Hill Ch. 169 ; Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa 315 : Tharpe v. Dunlap, 4
Heisk. 674 ; Warren v. Fenn, 28 Barb.
333 ; Corn v. Sims, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 391 ;
Garrison's Appeal, 2 Grant Cas. 216;
State v. Patten, 49 Afe. 383 ; Stockett
v. Goodman, 47 Md. 54; Seay v. Rome
Bank, 66 Ga. 609 ; Zuring v. Cox, 78
Ky. 527 ; incumbrances : Corning v.

White, 2 Piire 567 ; Walker v. M11iller,
I Ala. 1067 ; Crosby v. Hillyer, 24
Wend. 280; Van Heusen v. Radcliff
17 N. Y. 580; Mellon's Appeal, 32
Penn. St. 121; Swoyer's Appeal, 5 Id.
377 ; Tivelves v. Williams, 3 Whart. 485 ;
Wurtz v. Hart, 13 Iowa 515 ; Dimon v.
Delmonico, 35 Barb. 554; ltgan V.
,Strayhorn, 65 N. C. 279 ; In re Howe,
1 Paige Ch. 125; O'Hara v. Jones, 46
Ill. 288; Willis v. Henderson, 5 Id. 13 ;
and set-offs: Bank of Harrisburg v.
Sherlock, 16 Bapkr. Reg. 62 ; Ainslie
v. Boynton, 2 Barb. 258; _ry v. Boyd,
3 Gratt. 73; Wharton v. Hopkins, 11
Ired. 505; Haywood v. Me1icVair, 2 D.
& B. 283. But see McConnaughey v.
Chambers, 64 N. C. 284.
Thus, he takes real estate subject to
equitable liens for the purchase-money :

Corn v. Sims, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 391 ; and
see Zaring v. Cox, 78 Ky. 527; and ex
isting mortgages : Wurtz v. 11art, 13
Iowa 515 ; Dimon v. Delmonico, 35 Barb.
554; Luchenbach v. Brickenstein, 5 W.
& S. 145 ; judgment liens. See Crosby v.
Hillyer, 24 Wend. 280. But compare
Mifflin v. Rarey, 3 Rawle 483 ; mechanics' liens: Twelves v. WTilliams, 3
Whart. 485 ; Murry v. luteheson, 8
Abb. N. Cas. 423; and legacies charged
upon it: Couch v. Dleloplaine, 2 N. Y.
397; Stcoyer'sAppeal, 5 Penn. St. 377.
Likewise, he takes deposits in bank
subject to any lien which the bank may
have on the same: Beckwith v. Bank, 3
Wflirt; 485 ; goods levied upon subject
to the levy: Crosby v. Billyer, 24 Wend.
280 ; and, as stated, debts and choses
in action subject to the right of set-off in
the debtor: Bank of Harrisburgv. Sherlock; Ainslie v. Boynton; Fry v. Boyd;
Wharton v. Hopkins ; Haywood . v.
McNair, supra.
The owners of subsisting and valid
liens on, and equities in, the property
assigned, are in no wise affected in their
rights by the fact of the assignment. A
prior mortgagee, for example, may foreclose his mortgage after the assignment
as effectually as if it had not been made;
and if the assignee sells the mortgaged
property the interest of the mortgagee is
transferred to the fund arising irum the
sale: Lindermann v. Ingham, 36 Ohio
St. 1.
WHEN EQUITY, LIEN OR SET-oFr
MUST HAVE BEEN AcQUIRED. - The
equity, lien, or set-off, to be available,
must have been acquired prior to the
taking effect of the assignment: Smith
v. Brinckerhofl, 6 N. Y. 305 ; 1M1yers v.
Davis, 22 Id. 489; Martine v. Willis,

BLANDY v. HALL.
2 E. D. Smith 524; Bank v. Knox, 19
Gratt. 739, 747 ; Birdwell v. Cain, 1
Caldw. (!Tenn.) 301 ; Brashearv. West,
7 Pet. 608.
. But it has been held that
a lien attaching subsequent to the making of the assignment and prior to its acceptance by
the trustee has precedence : Crosby v.
Hillyer, 24 Wend. 280.
A set-off, to be maintainable against
the assignee, must have been also due at
the time of the assignment: Wells v.
Stewart, 3 Barb. 40 ; Keep v. Lord, 2
Duer 78; Lawrence v. Bank, 3 Rob.
142; Beckwith v. Bank, 9 N. Y. 211;
illyers v. Davis, 22 Id. 489 ; Lockwood
v. Beckwith, 6 Mich. 168, 175. Contra.
(N. Y.) 275.
31aas v. Goodman, 2 ilt.
And see Mlorrow v. Bright, 20 Mo.
298; ry v. Boyd, 3 Gratt. 73. It is
not sufficient that it became due before
suit was commenced : Hicks v. McGrorty,
2 Deer 295. Or, if a judgment, it must
have been obtained before the assignment: Ogden v. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160.
A creditor cannot set off his claim
against the value of goods purchased at
the assignee's sale: Bateman v. Connor,
1 Halst. L. 104.
ASSIGNEE NOT .A " BONA-PIDE PuCHASE."-It has been attempted to
establish the doctrine that an assignee
for the benefit of creditors is a "bona
fide purchaser" for value within the contemplation of the registry and other acts
designed for the protection of such parties, and hence not bound, for instance,
by prior equities of which he had no notice at the time of the assignment; but
while this view has been entertained by
several courts: Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns.
Ch. 182; Wickham v. Martin, 13 Gratt.
427 ; Evans v. Greenhow, 15 Id. 153 ;
Exchange Bank v. Knox, 19 Id. 739; Hollister v. Loud, 2 Mich. 309 ; Gates v.
Labeume, 19 Mo. 17. Also see Wise v.
Wimer, 23 Mo. 237; Bardcastle v.
Fisher, 24 Id. 70 ; the prevailing opinion is that unless there be a consideration
therefor of some sort at the time, or

some right given up, an assignment for
the benefit of creditors will not constitute
the assignee nor the creditors bona ,fide
purchasers for value within the meaning
of such statutes, but they will, so far as
such provisions are concerned, take subject to prior and valid equities and liens,
whether or not they had notice of them :
Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231 ; Frow v.
Dowman, 11 Ala. 880; Walker v. Miller,
Id. 1067 ; Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich.
444 ; Knowles v..Lord, 4 Whart. 500 ;
Haggerty v. Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. 437 ;
Griffin v. Marquardt, 17 N. Y. 28;
Maas v. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275 ; Willis
v. Henderson, 5 I1. 13; Slade v. Van
Tecten,ll Paige 21 ; Arnoldv. Grimes
2 Ia. (Clarke) 1 ; Wolf v. Eichelberger,
2 P. & W. (Penn.) 346; Twelres v.
Williams, 3 Whart. 485; Vandyke v.
Christ, 7 W. & S. 373; In re Howe, 1
Paige Ch. 125; Legerv. Bonaffee, 2 Barb.
475; Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Id. 637 ;
Sieman v. Austin, 33 Id. 20 ; Reed v.
Sands, 37 Barb. 185; Snhieffelin v.
Hawkins, 14 Abb. Pr. 118; s. c. 1
Daly 294; Ray v. Birdseye, 2 Denio
626; Wood v. Robinson, 22 N. Y. 567;
Van Waggoner v. Moses, 26 N. J. L.
570 ; Bridoqford v. Barbour, 80 Ky. 529.
LIEN VOID AS TO CRxDITos.-The
doctrine of the principal case expressed
in the first paragraph of the syllabus,
namely, that "a mortgage void as to
creditors [by reason of some inherent
defect or a failure to file or have recorded] is void as against an assignee
for the benefit of creditors," is not unIndeed, although it is
controverted.
supported by the former decision of the
same court in Hanes v. Tiffany, therein
cited, and decisions elsewhere : Building
Association v. Willson, 41 Md. 506;
Swift v. Thompson, 9 Conn. 63; Rood
v. Wdch, 28 Id. 157 ; In re Leland, 10
Blatch. 503; Barker v. Smith, 12 Bank.
Reg. 474, it is contradicted by decisions
of courts of very high authority : Vanheusena. Radclff, 17 N. Y. 580 ; Mellon's
Appeal, 32 Penn. St. 121 ; Luckenbach
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V. Brclkenstein, 5 W. & S. 145;
Wakeman v. Barrows, 41 Mich. 363;
and consult Williams v. Winsor, 12 R.
I. 9 ; Lockwood v. Slevin, 26 Ind. 124;
Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 Harr. & Johns.
61. These different decisions proceed
upon different theories as to the position
of the assignee and the relation he sustains to the several parties interested in
the assignment. The one class consider
him as the representative of the creditors,
and possessing, in such capacity, the
most of their rights and powers; the
other, treat him as the representative of
the assignor, and subject, in his rights
and powers, to all things to which the
assignor himself was subject. Thus, in
the principal case, as has been observed,
the judge delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "By the assignment the
rights of creditors passed to the assignee
as matter of law. The possession of the
assignee was the possession of creditors.
The right of creditors to seize the property in the hands of the assignee did
not exist, but the assignee was bound, in
law, to administer the trust for their
benefit. Every right which the creditors
might have asserted against the property
before the assignment, the assignee is
bound to secure for their benefit after
the assignment," while in Mellon's Appeal, supra, it was said that "the
assignee is the representative of the assignor, and is affected by all the equities
which existed against the property in the
hands of his assignor, enjoying his
rights, and no others, except that the
property is protected from execution in

his hands. He is in no sense the representative of the creditors, and, therefore,
cannot take to himself any of their
rights."
CONVEYANCE

FRAUDULENT

AND

VOID AS TO CtEDITORs.-The authori-

ties are in like dispute as to the power
of the assignee to take advantage of the
common statutory provision that conveyances (including mortgages) in fraud of
creditors shall be void ; some holding
that he has this power: Pillsbury v.
Kingon, 33 N. J. Eq. 287; s. c. 36
Am. Rep. 556 ; Hallowell v. Bagliss, 10
Ohio St. 537 ; Waters v. Dashiell, 1 Md.
455. See also Freelandv. Freeland, 102
Mass. 475, Sipranv. .Etna Ins. Co.,
29 Conn. 245; Shirle v. Long, 6 Rand.
735 ; while others hold that be has not:
House v. Creiaer, 13 Neb. 298; Heinrichs v. Woods, 7 Mo. App. 236 ; Sere
v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332; Estamroo v.
Messersmith, 18 Wis. 572 ; Browning v.
Bart, 6 Barb. 91 ; Leach v. Kilsey, 7
Id. 466; M1aulers v. Culters, I Diev.
164; Carr v. Gale, 3 Woodb. & M. 68;
Flower v. Cornish, 25 Minn. 473; Hahn
v. Salmon, 20 Fed. Rep. 801.
WHEN

LIENHOLDEit ENTITLED TO

DhVDEND.-A creditor who has a claim
secured by a lien is entitled to a dividend
from the assignee only on such residue
of his claim as may remain unpaid after
he has exhausted the property subject to
his lien : Re Knowles, 13 R. I. 90;
WVurtz v. Hart, 13 Iowa 515.
L. K. MimHLs.

Akron, Ohio.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
STATE EX EL. WEBSTER v. NEBRASKA TELEPHONE CO.
Where a corporation or person assumes and undertakes to supply a public demand,
made necessary by the commerce of the country, such as a public telephone, such
demand must be supplied to all alike, without discrimination.
Telephone companies being common carriers of news, all persons are entitled to

equal facilities in the enjoyment of the benefits to be derived from the use of the tele-
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phone; and where no good reason is assigned for a refusal by a telephone company
to furnish a telephone instrument to a person who desires to become a subscriber
and tenders a full compliance with all the rules established for other subscribers, a
writ of mandamus will issue to compel such company to furnish such person with the
necessary instruments.
Respondentis the owner of and isconductinga system ofpublic telephone exchanges
in Nebraska and Iowa, including in its circuit about fifteen hundred telephone instruments, supplied by it to that number of subscribers, upon the terms fixed by itself.
Relator applied to be admitted as a subscriber and was refused. He tendered a full
compliance with all the rules of the company. His place of business was accessible,
no reason being shown why his request should not be granted. On an application
for a mandamus : Hdd, that the telephone is a public servant in the commerce of the
country, and that respondent, having undertaken to supply the demand must supply to
all alike, without discrimination ; and that, having undertaken to supply the demand,
in the city of L., wherein relator resided, and being fully able to furnish him with a
telephone instrument, the same as its other subscribers, it was his duty to do so.
APPLICATION for mandamus.
ciently stated in the opinion.

The facts of the case are suffi-

J. R. Webster,, for relator.
B. S. Nall, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REESE, J.-This is an original application for a mandamus to
compel the respondent to place and maintain in the office of the
relator a telephone and transmitter, such as are usually furnished
to the subscribers of the respondent. The respondent has refused
to furnish the instruments, and presents several excuses and reasons for its refusal, some of which we will briefly notice. It appears
that during the year 1883 the respondent placed an instrument in
the office of the relator, but for some reason failed to furnish the
relator with a directory or list of its subscribers in Lincoln, and
various other cities and villages within its circuit, and which
directory the relator claimed was essential to the profitable use of
the telephone, and which it was the custom of respondent to furnish
to its subscribers. Finally, the directory was furnished, but upon
pay-day the relator refused to pay for the use of the telephone
during the time the respondent was in default with the directory.
Neither party being willing to yield, the instruments were removed.
Soon afterwards the relator applied to the agent of the respondent
and requested to become a subscriber, and to have an instrument
placed in his place of business, which the respondent refused to do.
It is insisted that the conduct of the relator now relieves respondent
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from any obligation to furnish the telephone, even if such obligation
would otherwise exist. We cannot see that the relation of the
parties to each other can have any influence upon their rights and
obligations in this action. If relator is indebted to respondent
for the use of its telephone, the law gives it an adequate remedy
by an action for the amount due. If the telephone has become
such a public servant as to be subject to the process of the courts
in compelling it to discharge public duties, the mere fact of a misunderstanding with those who desire to receive its public beiefits
will not alone relieve it from the discharge of those duties. While
either or perhaps both of the parties may have been in the wrong,
so far as the past is concerned, we fail to perceive how it can affect
the rights of the parties to this action.
The pleadings and proofs show that the relator is an attorney at
law in Lincoln, Nebraska; that he is somewhat extensively engaged
in the business of his profession, which extends to Lincoln and
Omaha, and surrounding cities and county seats, including quite a
number of the principal towns in southeastern Nebraska; that this
territory is occupied by respondent exclusively, together with a
large portion of southwestern Iowa, including in all about fifteen
hundred different instruments. By the testimony of one of the
principal witnesses for respondent, we learn that the company is
incorporated for the purpose of furnishing individual subscribers
telephone connection with each other under the patents owned by
the American Telephone Company; instruments to be furnished
by said company and sublet' by the Nebraska Telephone Company
to the subscribers to it. This is clearly the purpose of the organi-zation. While it is true, as claimed by respondent, that it has been
organized under the general corporation laws of the state, and in
some matters has no higher or greater rights than an ordinary corporation, yet it is also true that it has assumed to act in a capacity
which is to a great extent public, and has, in the large territory
covered by it, undertaken to satisfy a public want or necessity.
This public demand can only be supplied by complying with the
necessity which has sprung into existence by the introduction of
the instrument known as the telephone, and which new demand
or necessity in commerce the respondent proposes satisfying.
It is also true that the respondent is not possessed of any special
privileges under the statutes of the state, and that it is not under
quite so heavy obligations, legally, to the jpublic as it would be,
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had it been favored in that way. But we fail to see just how that
fact relieves it. While there is no law giving it a monopoly of the
business. in the territory covered by its wires, yet it must be apparent to all that the mere fact of this territory being covered by the
"plant" of respondent, from the very nature and character of its
business, gives it a monopoly of the business which it transacts.
No two companies will try to cover the same territory. The
demands of the commerce of the present day make the telephone
a necessity. All people, upon complying with the reasonable rules
and demands of the owners of the commodity-p&tented as it isshould have the benefits of the new commerce. The wires of
respondent pass the office of the relator. 'Its posts are planted in
the street in front of his door. In the very nature of things,
no other wires or posts will be placed there while those of respondent remain. The relator never can be supplied with this new
element of commerce, so necessary in the prosecution of all kinds
of business, unless supplied by the respondent. He has tendered
to it all the money required by it from its other subscribers in
Lincoln for putting in an instrument. He has proven, and it is
conceded by respondent, that he is able, financially, to meet all the
payments which may become due in the future. It is shown that
his office can be supplied with less expense and trouble to respondent than many others which are furnished by it. No reason can
be assigned why respondent should not furnish the required instruments, except that it does not want to. There could, and doubtless
does, exist, in many cases, sufficient reason for failing to comply
with such a demand ; but they are not shown to exist in this case.
It is known to be essential to the business interests of relator that
his office be furnished with a telephone. The value of such property
is, of course, conceded by respondent; but, by its attitude, it says
it will destroy those interests, and give to some one in the same
business, who may have been more friendly, this advantage over
him.
It is said by respondent that it has public telephone stations in
Lincoln, some of which are near relator's office, and that he is
entitled to and may use such telephone to its full extent by coming
there; that, like the telegraph, it is bound to send the messages
of relator, but it can as well do it from these public stations; that
it is willing to do so, and that is all that can be required of it.
Were it true that respondent had not undertaken to supply a public
VOL. XXXIH--34

266

STATE v. NEBRSAKA TELEPHONE CO.

demand beyond that undertaken by the telegraph, then its obligations would extend no further. But as the telegraph has undertaken
to the public to send dispatches from its offices, so the telephone has
undertaken with the public to send messages from its instruments,
one of which it proposes to supply to each person or interest requiring it, if conditions are reasonably favorable. This is the basis
upon which it proposes to operate,-the demand which it proposes
to supply. It has so assumed and undertaken to the public. That
the telephone, by the necessities of commerce and public use, has
become a public servant, a factor in the commerce of the nation,
and of a great portion of the civilized world, cannot be questioned.
Itis to all intents and purposes a part of the telegraphic system of
the country, and in so far as it has been introduced for public use,
and has been undertaken by the respondent, so far should the
respondent be held to the same obligation as the telegraph and
other public servants. It has assumed the responsibilities of a
common carrier of news. It has and must be held to have taken
its place by the side of the telegraph as such common carrier.
The views herein expressed are not new. Similar questions have
arisen in, and have been frequently discussed and decided by, the
courts, and no statute has been deemed necessary to aid the courts
in holding that when a person or company undertakes to supply a
demand which is "affected with a public interest," it must supply
all alike, who are alike situated, and not discriminate in favor of
nor against any. This reasoning is not met by saying that the
rules laid down by the courts as applicable to railroads, express
companies, telegraphs, and other older servants of the public, do
not apply to telephones, for the reason that they are of recent
invention, and were not thought of at the time the decisions were
made, and hence are not affected by. them, and can only be reached
by legislation. The principles established and declared by the
courts, and which were and are demanded by the highest material
interests of the country, are not confined to the instrumentalities
of commerce, nor to the particular kind of service known or in use
at the time when these principles were enunciated, "but they keep
pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the
new developments of time and circumstances. They extend from
the horse with its rider to the stage coach, from the sailing vessel
to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad,
and from the railroad to the telegraph," and from the telegraph to
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the telephone, "as these new agencies are successfully brought into
use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.
They were intended for the government of the business to which
they related, at all times and under all circumstances :" Pensacola
Tel. Co. v. TV. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 9.
In State v. Bell Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, a writ of mandamus was granted by the Supreme Court of Ohio to compel the
telephone company to place one of its telephone instruments in
the place of business of the relator, and to give it equal facilities
with other telegraph companies. This decision was based upon the
statute of that state which provided that telegraph companies should
receive dispatches from and for other telegraph companies' lines,
and from and for individuals, and transmit them with impartiality
and good faith, under a penalty of one hundred dollars, and that
the provisions of the act should apply also to telephone companies.
So far as the obligations of the telegraph companies are defined by
the act (except the payment of the .penalty) they are simply declarative of the common law. These obligations are imposed by the
demands of commerce and trade, and it would be idle to say they
existed only by force of the statute; and the same is true of the
clause in the act making its provisions applicable to telephones.
See authorities cited in the brief of relator in that case. But the
court declines discussing that question, as the question between
the parties could be determined by reference to the statute. In
Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East 527, the Court of King's Bench, in England, in 1810, held that "where private property is, by the consent
of the owner, invested with a public interest or privilege for the
benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private
property only, but must hold it subject to the rights of the public,
in the exercise of that public interest conferred for their benefit."
In Vincent v. Ohicago J' A. R. Co., 49 Ill. 38, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that it was the duty of a railroad company
to make a personal delivery of consigned property to the consignee,
in cases where such delivery was practicable, and that the duty
existed independent of the statute, and it was within the power of
the court to enforce the observance of such duty. See, also, People
v. Manhattan Gas-light Co., 45 Barb. 136 ; Chicago N. . By.
Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365; Munn v. Plinois, 94 U. S.113.
It is insisted by the respondent that mandamus is not the proper
remedy in this case; that if the obligations contended for by the

